Cyber Security for Fund Managers

About SBAI Toolbox

The SBAI Toolbox is an additional aid to complement the SBAI’s standard-setting activities. While fund managers sign up to the Alternative Investment Standards on a comply-or-explain basis, the SBAI Toolbox materials serve as a guide only and are not formally part of the Alternative Investment Standards (the Standards). The SBAI will not hold dedicated consultations in relation to the Toolbox contents; however, it will involve its stakeholders (managers, investors, regulators etc.) in brainstorming and developing the Toolbox contents via its Institutional Investor Roundtables, and it will update the materials from time to time.

Over time the SBAI will add relevant content to the SBAI Toolbox. Managers, investors, board directors, service providers, regulators and others are invited to draw upon the SBAI Toolbox materials and suggest any additions or other areas that it would be helpful to cover.

Executive Summary

Cyber security has become an increasingly prominent focus of the industry. Regulators also are taking a strong interest in understanding and assessing regulated firms’ resilience to cyber-attacks. This memo provides a brief overview of existing high-level cyber risk management tools, which fund managers (and others) can use to develop their tailored approach to cyber security, a framework to identify a firm’s key digital assets (“crown jewels”), a list of practical “quick win cyber security action items” and an overview of “cyber security projects” to enhance a firm’s resilience, including the development of an “Incident Response Plan”. Where possible, this memo refers to widely-accepted resources, as well as additional guidance particularly suitable for small and medium-sized firms. The last section focuses on “what regulators want to see” in terms of cyber risk preparedness, including an overview of regulatory requirements, guidance and approaches to cyber security for a number of key jurisdictions (also see Appendix A).

Introduction

Cyber crime is defined as “a harmful activity, executed by one group or individual through computers, IT systems and/or the internet and targeting the computers, IT infrastructure and internet presence of another entity”.\(^1\) The motives behind cyber-attacks can be manifold, ranging from fraud, espionage (nation states, terrorists), “hacktivism” (motivated by political motives), insider sabotage or theft, or disruption (for fun). Regulators are particularly concerned about the

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\(^1\) IOSCO Research Department Definition
wider systemic consequences of cyber crime (e.g. massive reputational damage across entire sectors, and effects on market availability and integrity).

Cyber security threats will vary in nature and scale as a function of an organisation’s vulnerabilities and “crown jewels” (confidential information, personal data of customers, critical systems, proprietary algorithms, trading book) and vulnerabilities. These “crown jewels” also will differ significantly by type of firm. For example, the availability of an online banking platform may be integral to the value proposition of a retail bank (and integral to the clients’ trust), while the (possibly static) website of an institutional asset manager may play a much less important role in delivering the firm’s services. In fact, different business units within an organisation may view different types of data/infrastructure as critical.

Therefore, a clear understanding of the firm’s “crown jewels” and the impact of a cyber-attack on them are the first steps in determining the types of protections an organisation needs. The chart below lists some typical “crown jewels”, though the list is not exhaustive.

**ILLUSTRATION: WHAT ARE AN ASSET MANAGER’S DIGITAL “CROWN JEWELS”?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crown jewel</th>
<th>Type of threat</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Other Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Client data                          | • Cyber spying/theft/publication on the internet (confidentiality)  
• Destruction/sabotage (integrity) | HIGH            | • Indirect threat of cyber-attacks on service providers who hold or have access to a firm’s critical data  
• Possible second order effects (e.g. stolen data used to pursue clients) |
| Proprietary algorithms/strategies     | • Theft (confidentiality)  
• Sabotage (integrity/availability) | MEDIUM-HIGH      | Function of sophistication/digitisation of approach (e.g. automated CTA vs. discretionary manager) |
| Trading book                         | • Theft/publication (confidentiality)  
• Sabotage (integrity) | MEDIUM          | • Particularly relevant to activist managers  
• Risk of short squeeze |
| Ongoing ability to execute trades    | • Disruption (availability), inability to manage the portfolio can result in breach of contractual provisions in offering documents  
• Broader market liquidity implications of sectoral attacks | MEDIUM-HIGH      | Particularly relevant to automated traders; manual/voice-based fall back solutions? |
| Public website/client login          | • Denial-of-service attack/hackers take control (availability)  
• Data theft (confidentiality)       | LOW-MEDIUM       | Public visibility of damage might require a swift and proactive approach to communicate with clients and, possibly, regulators |

Various surveys indicate that over 60% of threats are caused by "people issues" (such as use of weak login credentials, phishing, disgruntled employees, etc.), rather than technological failures.\(^2\) This

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\(^2\) E.g. [Verizon 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report](#) and [2015 Data Breach Investigations Report](#)
highlights the fact that cyber security is not just an IT issue but requires a much broader approach and ownership within organisations -“tone from the top” and a culture of ownership of cyber risk throughout an organisation are critical.

**High level cyber risk management tools and guidance**

Many resources exist to help firms structure their approach to addressing cyber risks, including cross-sectoral frameworks, such as the [NIST Framework](#) and the ISO/IEC 27000-series security standards. In addition, there are certification standards, such as COBIT and the Cyber Essentials frameworks in the UK. Some of the cyber risk management tools and guidance are very general in nature but can help a firm to formulate and structure its overarching cyber security strategy and principles, while others are more “hands-on” and provide lists of explicit cyber security “to dos”. The challenge usually lies in translating these tools into relevant action, tailored to the specific risk profile of an organisation. In particular for medium-sized and smaller organisations, it is important to develop a targeted and efficient approach to address cyber security risks.

To help firms navigate these extensive resources, Appendix B provides a brief summary and assessment of the various cyber risk management tools, guidance and certification standards. The next section below (“Practical steps/quick wins”) has extracted from the above-mentioned tools and guidance some of the most important aspects relevant to fund managers and put them into a set of (i) technical cyber security “actions items” and (ii) an overview of cyber security projects (including “questions to ask”).

**Practical steps/“quick wins”**

While cyber-attacks are becoming more sophisticated, most breaches can be prevented relatively easily.4 There are a number of low cost measures that are fairly simple to implement and can reduce significantly the impact of attacks.

**TECHNICAL CYBER SECURITY ACTION ITEMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Summary Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Username and Password Protection</td>
<td>• Passwords must meet complexity requirements (characters from at least three of the following groups: lower case letters, upper case letters, numbers and symbols)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Password length of at least 8 characters for basic accounts, password length of at least 12 characters for customer or administrator accounts</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited amount of login attempts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Changing passwords regularly (for company internal accounts)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3 NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology (within the US Department of Commerce)

4 See [Verizon Cyber Security Survey 2013](#)

5 Based on expert input, adopting some of the recommendations included in [SIFMA Small Firm Cyber Security Guidance](#) July 2014, p. 6, NIST Framework
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Summary Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two-factor authentication for remote logins</td>
<td>for company internal accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrict administrative and privileged access</td>
<td>through preventative and detective controls to prevent unauthorized access or alteration of systems and/or data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweep of “undesired” applications from time to</td>
<td>Some guidance reports (e.g. SIFMA Small Firm Cyber Security Guidance) recommend Application Whitelisting as a basic approach; however, it can be complex to implement and maintain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive Controls</td>
<td>for systems and data through preventative and detective controls to prevent unauthorized access or alteration of systems and/or data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application Whitelisting</td>
<td>recommend Application Whitelisting as a basic approach; however, it can be complex to implement and maintain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardise on trusted operating systems that</td>
<td>Using unsupported or out-dated operating systems, such as Windows XP, presents risks to the network and critical data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilise automatic software updates, and spot-check that updates are applied frequently to ensure software currency and to reduce the risks associated with out-of-date, vulnerable software.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investing in and using cloud or physical external hard-drive backup systems provide an additional level of security for important data in the event that information is destroyed.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ensure that access to mobile devices requires authentication and that the stored data is encrypted (by the phone or additional software); firms will need to balance usability with potential risks. Optionally: Remote wiping capability if the device is lost or stolen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Updated anti-virus software, in addition to web security software, greatly reduces the risk of unintentional and intentional computer virus. Additionally, personal vigilance against suspicious emails and attachments greatly reduces cyber threats.</td>
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<tr>
<td>“End point” protection solutions (e.g. bundled in with antivirus product) System performance complaints from users can be early warning signs of a breach More complex approaches include detection of abnormal activity/behaviour of end users with alerts to the Security/IT administrator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are also a number of broader projects fund managers can undertake to develop a more tailored approach to addressing cyber security threats. Of particular relevance in this context is the development of an Incident Response Plan, which may tie in with a firm’s (1) broader disaster recovery measures (see Standard 17d) and (2) IT security framework (see Standard 17f). The table below provides an overview of different projects fund managers can undertake, including “questions to ask”.

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6 For example, overly complex password requirements often result in users trying to trick the system, e.g. choosing trivial [unsecure] passwords, writing them down or storing them in a file, and thereby defeating the purpose of enhancing security.
**OVERVIEW OF CYBER SECURITY PROJECTS AND QUESTIONS TO ASK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data protection</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Where is the critical data stored/replicated?</strong> Map out location of data (locally, cloud, separate physical back-up, etc.), determine if critical data is replicated on laptops, mobile devices, email accounts, etc. (restrict storage/duplication of critical data in unsafe areas)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Which data needs to be encrypted?</strong> Classify data e.g. as a function of confidentiality vs. ease of use to determine level of encryption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How is “data in transit” protected?</strong> Special consideration for securing the communications between third party service providers (counterparties, payroll providers, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>How is data backed up?</strong> Either cloud-based or independently maintained offline back-up systems (which separate data recovery infrastructure from network) with frequent system/data snapshots, archiving of snapshots and physical security measures to protect data and systems. It should be noted that while using the cloud will mean faster/easier access, it also carries the potentially higher risk that the data can be compromised.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Who needs access to critical data?</strong> Determine who can see/alter critical databases, access controls for temporary employees</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>What is going on in your network?</strong> Monitor data flows, abnormal behaviour detection (network and workstations), including externally managed services (note: encryption protects data but can defeat visibility of what is going on in the network); system hardening (removing non-essential programs/services)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Are the controls actually working?</strong> E.g. does the back-up actually work (or is it just plugged in)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>What infrastructure do we have?</strong> Firm-wide inventorying/mapping of technology resources</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How to make new systems more resilient?</strong> Ex ante incorporation of security considerations into software development (balance between efficient/integrated/optimised vs. (more resilient) diverse systems)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training &amp; Certification</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Are all employees aware of the different types of cyber security threats and how to protect against them?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Security awareness campaigns targeted at all employees (including senior management) and particular procedures for employees when they travel. Security awareness campaigns can be more (cost) efficient than certification exercises, particularly for smaller firms. “Tone from the top” and a culture where every employee knows they own cyber risk is essential.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Friendly spearfishing emails (sent by IT department, monitoring who clicks; additional IT training for those who click/list of offenders)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scenario exercises/case studies [simulating breaches and application of Incident Response Plan (see below)]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring industry incidents/cyber threat hunting, participation in industry wide information sharing</td>
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<td>Certification (in-house/third party)</td>
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</table>
### Incident Response Plan

**What should an Incident Response Plan include?**

- **Risk level evaluation framework:** assessing severity of impact on operations/”crown jewels” and determining level of response (e.g. active board level involvement (for severe threats) versus just IT/operational response (low level threats))
- **List of critical infrastructure** (to facilitate assessment/communication of impact)
- **Emergency key contact list:** board level, C-level, operational staff, external service providers (e.g. fund administrator, PR firm, legal advisors, etc.), regulators, police/law enforcement agencies (important to understand reporting requirements, e.g. FBI, UK National Fraud & Cybercrime Reporting Centre, etc.)
- **Action plan:**
  - Risk level evaluation [do we need board level involvement due to the severity of the threat, or can it be dealt with by operational teams/IT]
  - Technical assessment/actions: containment, backup data/preserving original media evidence, halt key processes/shut down equipment, conduct analysis from copy, review of logs (DNS, Firewalls, …)
  - Communication/notification to stakeholders (including determination of what information to share and with whom, what the legal and regulatory requirements are)
  - Remediation measures (e.g. deleting malicious/unauthorised code, post-attack audit of affected machines)
  - Forensic analysis/third party support
- **Other observations:**
  - Importance of clarity of responsibilities in case of a cyber security emergency
  - Keep hard copies of the Incident Response Plan (including emergency key contact list)
  - Integrate Incident Response Plan with Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP)/periodic disaster recovery exercises as an additional crisis scenario

A basic sample Incident Response Plan is available from the International Compliance Association.

### Continual reassessment

- Ongoing reassessment of cyber defence posture
- Benchmarking against best practice, including emerging best practice, is increasingly required by, of particular interest to, regulators
- Assessment of insurance coverage against cyber-attacks

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It is important to note that in areas where there is significant reliance on third party service providers in the supply chain, such as custody, prime brokerage and independent administration of assets, it may be unrealistic to assume that a fund manager can conduct in-depth due diligence on the cyber security measures implemented by such suppliers. However, firms can assess/monitor where service providers are given limited access to their own technology systems that inadvertently may enable unauthorised access to data/systems and actively manage the risk accordingly. In addition, firms should consider whether they require a minimum level of disclosure from any service provider.

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7 In some jurisdictions, serious security breaches of critical systems need to be reported (e.g. Monetary Authority of Singapore Notice on Technology Risk Management – see next section “What do regulators want to see?”)
provider with respect to that provider’s own cyber security risk management procedures and their effectiveness.\(^8\)

**What do regulators want to see?**

With the increasing regulatory focus on cyber security threats, firms want to better understand the level of security that is deemed sufficient to meet regulatory obligations. It is broadly acknowledged that a detailed and prescriptive approach to “regulating” cyber security will not work, given both the pace of technological innovation (in terms of the types of threats and protections), and the fact that there cannot be a “one size fits all” approach.

Regulators have taken different approaches to address cyber security concerns. Some focus explicitly on the management arrangements to address cyber-threats (including risk assessments, information security policies, training, business continuity planning) and have issued specific guidance materials. Others have a more principle-based approach, whereby cyber security is covered by the broader conduct obligations and existing operational risk management arrangements.

**The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),** for example, has started to focus on cyber security-related issues at regulated investment adviser and broker-dealer firms. In April 2014, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) announced its Cyber Security Initiative in a National Exam Program (“NEP”) Risk Alert. The recently published [Examination Sweep Summary](#) provides an overview on the areas of focus, including:

- Cyber security governance and oversight
- Policies, procedures and training
- Protection of networks and information
- Client remote access and risks associated with fund transfer requests
- Risks associated with third parties/vendors
- Protocols for reporting cyber breaches

The SEC’s OCIE also published its [Investment Management Cyber Security Guidance](#) in April 2015, which focusses on the measures firms may wish to consider, including:

- Periodic assessment of sensitivity/location of information, technology systems, internal and external threats, security controls, impact of breaches, effectiveness of governance arrangements
- Development of a strategy to prevent/detect cyber security threats

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\(^8\) The [Alternative Investment Technology Executives Club](https://www.AITEC.org), a community of senior management technologists (CTO/CIO/IT Director) within the alternative investment industry, has developed a dedicated vendor DDQ for its members, [which some brokers and administrators have already adopted](#).
• Written policies and procedures, training

In addition, the SEC’s OCIE published a Risk Alert (9/2015), highlighting some of the areas of focus for the second round of examinations. The Risk Alert indicates that there will be more testing of the firms’ procedures and controls and explicitly mentions protection of customer information as an area of focus. It also contains a sample list of materials the SEC’s OCIE may review during examinations. In 2016, cybersecurity continues to be the focus of the SEC’s OCIE and is one of the initiatives in the area of market-wide risks in the OCIE examination priorities.9

The approach of the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is anchored in the FCA’s Principles for Business, notably Principle Three (Management and Control)10. More details are included in the provisions of The Senior Management Arrangements and Controls (SYSC) Sourcebook (SYSC 3 System and Controls, SYSC 6.3 Financial Crime [mostly focussed on money laundering] and SYSC 21.1 Risk Control). Areas covered include the regular review of systems and controls and risk-centric governance arrangements. In addition, the FCA’s Principle 11 (Relations with regulators)11 may imply regulatory notification obligations (also see SUP 15: Notifications to the FCA or PRA). The FCA also provides a “One-minute guide” focussing specifically on (customer) data security (applicable to all regulated firms), including a Data Security Factsheet, which highlights aspects such as:

• Governance, compliance monitoring, training
• Systems and control, including physical safety of data, disposal of data
• Vetting of staff (e.g. credit checks, criminal record checks)
• Due diligence of third party service providers, staff awareness

Many other regulators have started to develop guidance and other resources to address cyber security concerns, and firms, which operate across multiple jurisdictions, need to be aware of these developments. Appendix A provides an overview of existing regulatory resources for some of the major financial regulators, including:

• Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC)
• Autorité des marchés financiers (Québec/Canada)
• Bank of England
• Financial Conduct Authority (UK)
• Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)

9 SEC Examination Priorities for 2016, p. 3 (https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2016.pdf)

10 Principle 3: A firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems.

11 Principle 11: Relations with regulators: A firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way, and must disclose to the appropriate regulator appropriately anything relating to the firm of which that regulator would reasonably expect notice
- Securities and Exchange Commission (US SEC)
- Securities and Futures Commission (Hong Kong SFC)
- Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA)

In light of the fast evolving nature of the threats and the limitations of prescriptive rules and regulations to mitigate them, financial regulators and other government agencies also have started to conduct cyber-attack simulations and surveys to better assess the threats, as well as the mitigants that have been put in place to address those threats. While many of these efforts are cross-sectoral (see Appendix C), some have a specific focus on attacks on financial market entities (e.g. Operation Waking Shark in the UK:12 focus on wholesale/investment banking and key financial market infrastructure). These efforts are equally relevant to fund managers and investors, since they help improve the understanding of how individual firms can be indirectly impacted by disruptions of key financial infrastructure and service providers (e.g. investment banks, custodians, exchanges, central depositories etc.). They also give an idea of the types of safeguards firms might wish to put in place to deal with such scenarios.

How to get started?

The following recommendations may help firms develop a cyber security strategy based on their particular circumstances:

- Understand your IT set-up, assess your specific vulnerabilities to different threats, and document these (see: Illustration What are an asset manager’s digital “crown jewels”, p.2)
- Develop a strategy/approach to protect, detect and respond to cyber security threats (see the section on Practical steps/quick wins)
- Develop an Incident Response Plan and conduct routine testing (see section on Practical steps/“quick wins”)
- Cross-functional set-up: involve IT, legal/compliance, HR, external advisors; ensure senior management/board buy-in (cyber security awareness as part of company culture); all employees should “own” management of cyber risk
- Develop security metrics and dashboards: to communicate progress (to internal and external stakeholders) and assess evolution of endogenous/exogenous threats
- Ensure continuous awareness of cyber security risks at all employee levels and participate in cross-sectoral information sharing/collaboration (benchmarking against best practice, even against practice outside the financial services sector, can be an effective means of developing the most effective cyber risk management programme)
- Culture of continuous improvement

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12 “Desktop Cyber exercise” coordinated by the UK authorities, including the Bank of England, FCA and HM Treasury: rehearsal of how major financial institutions would respond to a disruption in wholesale markets as a result of a concerted cyber-attack
It is important to recognise that cyber security is not a one-off exercise, but requires an ongoing effort to stay on top of the evolving nature of threats and adapt the cyber security strategy accordingly. In addition, regulators will continue to focus on cyber security, therefore, managers will need to understand the evolving regulatory expectations.
### Appendix A: Overview of regulatory requirements, guidance and approaches to cyber security (updated 06/2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulator</th>
<th>Content/Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC)** | - **Regulatory Guide 259**: Risk Management Systems for Responsible Entities  
  o Guidance to fund managers about their risk management systems, including some guidance on cyber resilience  
  o It gives specific guidance on how these entities may comply with their obligation under s912A(1)(h) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act) to maintain adequate risk management systems  
- **Report 429** (03/2015) on “Cyber resilience: health check”: includes a health check list (page 8-14) and relevant legal and compliance requirements for different types of regulated entities (Section D and Appendix 2)  
**Guides from other Australian agencies:**  
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) **Guide to securing personal information**  
- OAIC **Data breach preparation and response — A guide to managing data breaches in accordance with the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)**  
- The Australian Signals Directorate **Essential Eight Mitigation Strategies and Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents** – Mitigation Details  
| **Canadian Securities Administrators**         | - Cyber security is implicitly covered in Part 11 (internal controls and systems) of **Regulation 31-103 respecting Registration Requirements, Exemptions and Ongoing Registrant Obligations (c. V-1.1, r. 10)**  
- The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) published on 27 September 2016 **CSA Staff Notice 11-332 Cyber Security** to promote cyber-security awareness, preparedness and resilience in Canadian capital markets. The CSA also published on 19 October 2017 **CSA Staff Notice 33-321 Cyber Security and Social Media**, which summarizes survey results of registered firms' cyber security and social media practices, in addition to providing guidance to firms in these areas.  
- Staff from the British Columbia Securities Commission, the Ontario Securities Commission and the Autorité des marchés financiers published **Multilateral Staff Notice 51-347 Disclosure of cyber security risks and incidents** on 19 January 2017. The notice reports the findings of a review announced by the CSA in **Staff Notice 11-332 Cyber Security** and provides disclosure expectations for reporting issuers based on those findings.  
| **FCA Handbook**                               | - **SYSC 3 Systems and Controls**: focus on establishing and maintaining (1) systems and controls appropriate to the firm’s business and (2) risk-centric governance arrangements  
- **SYSC 6.3 Financial Crime**: mostly focussed on money laundering and where firms could be used to further financial crime  
- **Principle 3: Management and Control**: “…reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems” |

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13 In addition to the dedicated approaches of financial regulators, a number of national governments have conducted cyber-attack simulations and surveys on cyber security preparedness. Examples are included in Appendix C.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulator</th>
<th>Content/Observations</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SBAI To...</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>box Cyber Security</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Page 12</strong></td>
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</table>

**Regulator**

- **Principle 11: Relations with regulators/disclosure**: “... deal with regulators in an open and cooperative way” and disclosure to regulators; **SUP 15** implies requirement to notify the FCA or PRA of serious cyber security incidents (e.g. SUP 15.3.1 Matters having serious regulatory impact)

*Issues relating to cyber security implicitly addressed in the FCA Handbook in a principle-based fashion; no dedicated cyber security section.*

- Additional **FCA Resources on cyber resilience**, including publications, and reporting of cyber incidents
- **Good cyber security – the foundations** (1 pager)
- **“Our approach to Cyber security in financial services firms”** (speech, 21 September 2016) [Security culture, good governance, identify key assets, protections, detections, recovery/response, information sharing]

| International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO): Report on IOSCO’s cyber risk coordination efforts | The report provides an overview of some of the different regulatory approaches related to cyber security that IOSCO members have implemented thus far. Regulators are generally still in the early stages of developing policy responses in the area of cyber security. The report is organized around the relevant segments of the securities markets, namely: reporting issuers; trading venues; market intermediaries; asset managers; and financial market infrastructures.

The report makes numerous references to the SBAI Cyber Security Memo. |

| Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS): Technology Risk Management Guidelines and Notice on Technology Risk Management | **Guidelines**

- Technology risk management principles and best practices that focus on:
  - Establishing a sound and robust technology risk management framework.
  - Strengthening system security, reliability, resiliency and recoverability.
  - Implementing strong authentication to protect customer data, transactions and systems.

**Notice**

- Sets out requirements on
  - High reliability, availability and recoverability of critical systems.
  - IT controls to protect customer information from unauthorized access or disclosure.
  - Notification of serious security breaches or failure of critical systems to MAS.

*The Cyber Security Agency (CSA) under the Prime Minister’s office, coordinates building cyber capabilities and collaborating with the private sector to monitor, detect and mitigate the impact of cyber risks.*

| National Futures Association (NFA) Self-Examination Questionnaire (02/2016) | Cyber security questions were added to the NFA Self-Examination Questionnaire

This section is designed to help member firms comply with NFA’s **Information Systems Security Programs** (ISSP) rules and interpretations which came into effect on 1 March 2016
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulator</th>
<th>Content/Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **US Securities and Exchange Commission** | **Regulation:**  
- **Regulation S-P** (adopt written policies and procedures that address administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for the protection of customer records and information)  
- **Regulation S-ID** (Subpart C): Identity Theft Red Flags; Adopting release  
- **Compliance Rules (Compliance procedures and practices):** [Investment Company Act Rule 38-1, Investment Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-7, Adopting release for ICA Rule 38-1 and IAA Rule 206(4)-7](https://www.sec.gov/rules/fgd/2015/iaa-cyb-16-08-4.pdf) (see Section II(A)(1) of the Adopting Release, which provides additional information about issues that the policies and procedures of funds or advisers should consider, certain of which are related to cybersecurity)  
**Engaging Government Agencies and Industry:**  
- **Cybersecurity Guidance for Investment Advisers and Registered Investment Companies** (April 2015):  
  - Conduct periodic assessment of (1) nature, sensitivity and location of information, ... (2) threats to the IT systems, (3) security controls/processes, (4) impact if systems are compromised, (5) effectiveness of governance structure  
  - Create strategy to prevent and detect threats  
  - Written policies/procedures/training  
- **Guidance on Business Continuity Planning for Registered Investment Companies** (June 2016)  
**Assessing Market Participant Readiness**  
- **OCIE August 2017 – Observations from Cybersecurity Examinations**  
- **OCIE May 2017 – Cybersecurity: Ransomware Alert**  
- **OCIE September 2015 Cybersecurity Examination Initiative:** Particular focus on protection of client information and cyber security-related basic controls (governance and risk assessment, access rights and control, data loss prevention, vendor management, training, incident response). The appendix contains a sample list of materials the OCIE may review  
- **OCIE Summary of 2014 Cybersecurity Examination Sweep:** Summary of examination findings of 57 registered broker-dealers and 49 registered investment advisers, focusing on information security policies, business continuity plans, use of external standards (e.g. NIST, ISO or FFIEC frameworks), periodic risk assessments, approach to service providers/vendors, etc.  
  *Provides a good understanding of the OCIE’s examination priorities; the program is still being developed/enhanced*  
- **SEC Cybersecurity Roundtable** |

| National Conference of State Legislatures (US) | Overview of security breach notification laws (legislation requiring entities to notify individuals of security breaches of information involving personally identifiable information) |
| Securities and Futures | **Part IV (Information Management) of “Management, Supervision and Internal Control Guidelines for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the Securities and Futures Commission”:** policies and procedures are required to be |

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14 SEC OCIE: Securities and Exchange Commission Office for Compliance Inspections and Examinations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulator</th>
<th>Content/Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commission of Hong Kong</td>
<td>established to ensure integrity, security, availability, reliability and completeness of all information, including documentation and electronically stored data, relevant to the firm’s business operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- <strong>Para 18.5 (Adequacy of System) of “Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the Securities and Futures Commission”</strong>: also requires that a licensed or registered person should ensure the integrity of the electronic trading system it uses or provides to clients, as may be appropriate in the circumstances, including the system’s reliability, security and capacity; firms also should have appropriate contingency measures in place.</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Circulators:</strong></td>
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<td>- <strong>Circular dated 11 June 2015</strong> issued to all licensed corporations about launching of an internet trading self-assessment checklist by the Commission. The checklist provides guidance for licensed corporations to conduct regular self-assessment of their internet trading systems, network infrastructure, related policies, procedures and practices in order to identify areas that require improvement and, where needed, enhance the same so to ensure compliance with the relevant electronic trading requirements.</td>
</tr>
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<td>- <strong>Circular dated 13 Oct 2016</strong> which announced the commencement of a cybersecurity review with a focus on assessing the cybersecurity preparedness, compliance and resilience of brokers’ internet/mobile trading systems.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>- <strong>Circular dated 15 May 2017</strong> to all licensed corporations to remind them to be alert for cybersecurity threats (including ransomware attacks) and implement appropriate measures to address the risks.</td>
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<td>- Two circulars dated 27 Oct 2017 to the licensed corporations engaged in internet trading:</td>
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<td>- <strong>Release of the “Guidelines for Reducing and Mitigating Hacking Risks Associated with Internet Trading”</strong> which set out 20 baseline preventive, detective and other control requirements for the industry to improve cybersecurity resiliency (minimum standards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Applies to the following licensed corporations: Type 1 regulated activity (dealing in securities); Type 2 regulated activity (dealing in futures contracts); Type 3 regulated activity (leveraged foreign exchange trading). For the avoidance of doubt, these Guidelines shall only apply to leveraged foreign exchange traders licensed by the SFC; and/or Type 9 regulated activity (asset management) to the extent that they distribute funds under their management through their internet-based trading facilities.</td>
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<td>▪ <strong>Good industry practices for IT risk management and cybersecurity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Senior management, with the help of solution providers or technical consultants if needed, should ensure that all systems and controls are commensurate with the firm’s business needs and operations, and implement additional cybersecurity controls as necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ List of some good industry practices which internet brokers may wish to consider incorporating into their information technology and cybersecurity risk management frameworks.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
|                         | **Note:** The two circulars dated 27 Oct 2017 can apply to fund managers which distribute funds under their management through their internet-based trading facilities (as mentioned in Note 2 of the Press Release [http://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-announcements/news/doc?refNo=17PR133], “licensed or registered persons.”)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Regulator</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)</strong></td>
<td>• <strong>General Resources</strong>, including small firm <a href="#">cyber security checklist</a> (based on NIST cyber security framework and <a href="#">FINRA Report on Cyber Security Practices</a> (02-2015))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA)** | • Swiss licensees according to the [Swiss Collective Investment Schemes Act](#) (CISA) are required to maintain a proper organisational structure, including risk management, internal control system and compliance according to art. 14 (1 c) in connection with art. 12 and 12a of the [Swiss Collective Investment Schemes Ordinance](#) (CISO). In principle this also includes proper processes to deal with cyber risks  
  • Additionally, Swiss licensees must comply with the provisions of the [Federal Act on Data Protection](#) (FADP) which aims to protect the privacy and fundamental rights of persons when their data is processed  
  • New guidelines for banks (as of 22 September 2016): [Rundschreiben 2008/21 "Operationelle Risiken – Banken"](#) (vgl. Rz. 135.6 ff.)  
  • Guidance on IT outsourcing (banks, insurers): see [Rundschreiben 2018/03 Outsourcing Banken und Versicherungen](#) (vgl. Rz. 24 und 25)  
  • **Coverage** of Cyber Risk and digitalisation during the 2018 FINMA media conference  
  
  • Based on previous version [NCS 2012-2017](#) and further recommendations ([Empfehlungen des Beirats Zukunft Finanzplatz vom August 2017](#))  
  • The strategy defines seven objectives (see page 11 of the NCS 2018-2022)  
  • Next steps: Development of implementation plan national government, Cantons in collaboration with industry) (see [press release](#) from Eidgenoessisches Finanzdepartement)  
  
  **Separately, additional guidance and recommendations have been published by industry associations for the financial sector:**  
  • The Swiss Funds and Asset Management Association (SFAMA) issued its [Code of Conduct (CoC)](#), which contains principles with regard to a proper organizational structure (60ff), including an adequate Business Continuity Management (BCM) process (70) |
## Appendix B: Overview – Cyber risk management tools and guidance

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
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</table>
| **NIST**<sup>15</sup> Framework (02/2014) | • Sets out cyber security activities and desired outcomes  
  • Management of risks along key functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover  
  • [Department of Homeland Security C3 Voluntary Program](#) assists stakeholders with understanding and use of the Framework and other cyber risk efforts | • High level cyber risk management tool, applicable across sectors  
  • In early adoption phase, intended to align with ISO/IEC27001/27002 and COBIT 5 (see below)  
  • NIST Framework referred to in the SEC’s inspection priorities  
  • Australian Securities and Exchange Commission (ASIC) also references the NIST framework in its Report 429 “Cyber resilience: health check” |
| ISO/IEC 27000 series and [ISO/IEC 27032: “Information Security Management” and “Cyber Security”](#) | • Managing the security of assets such as financial information, intellectual property, employee details etc.  
  • Risk management process focussing on people, processes, IT- systems  
  • ISO 27032 specifically addresses “Cyber security”, defined as the “preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information in the cyber space” | • Cross-sectoral  
  • Full Standard not publicly available (can be purchased on the ISO website)  
  • ISO 27032, published in July 2012, is particularly interesting in the area of cyber security controls and is more up to date and complete than the ISO 27002 code of practice |
| SIFMA Small firms Cyber Security Guidance<sup>16</sup> | • Practical, contains immediate action items, and links to technical cyber security solutions, training and points of contact  
  • Builds on the NIST framework | • Cross-sectoral  
  • Hands-on guidance  
  • Focus on US training/points of contacts |
| CBEST (Bank of England, HMT, FCA) | • Financial sector-focussed vulnerability testing framework (third party penetration testing)  
  • Intelligence-based, focused on more sophisticated attacks, adapts to evolving landscape  
  • Assesses people, processes and technology | • Driven by financial stability concerns, focussed on core financial services firms/brokers/infrastructure providers in the UK  
  • The accreditation standards have been developed with [CREST](#), the not-for-profit organisation representing the technical information security industry |
| Cyber Essentials certification framework | • Certification framework, involving an assessment (incl. vulnerability assessment) by an independent certifying body  
  • Based on the UK government “10 Steps to Cyber Security” | • Basic approach, primary focus on SMEs (cross-sectoral)  
  • Suppliers bidding for UK government contracts which involve handling of sensitive and personal information must be compliant with the Cyber Essentials controls framework |

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<sup>15</sup> NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology (Agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce)  

<sup>16</sup> SIFMA: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
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<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
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<th>Assessment</th>
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| **US Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)** | • Dedicated Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure working group  
• Provides resources, including a [Cyber Security Assessment Tool](#), to help understand supervisory expectations and mitigate risks                                                                                                                                   | • Financial institutions focus  
• Extensive resources                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| **COBIT 5 framework**                               | • Framework for the governance and management of IT  
• Focus on bridging the gap between control requirements, technical issues and business risk  
• Enabling policy development for IT control                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | • Cross-sectoral  
• The COBIT framework (and various other certifications) are ISACA (previously known as The Information Systems, Audit and Control Association) brands  
• The materials are free to ISACA members only and can be purchased by non-members on the ISACA website.                                                                                                                |
| **ISF (Internet Security Forum)**                   | • Standard of good practice for information security  
• Updated in 2014 for cyber resilience guidance  
• Covers the spectrum of information security arrangements needed to manage the business risks linked to information systems                                                                                                                                               | • Practical and “hands on”  
• Cross-sectoral  
• ISF is a not-for-profit membership organisation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
Appendix C: Examples of official cyber-attack simulations, surveys and international cooperation

Firms may find some of these simulations and surveys interesting from the perspective of “lessons learned”, emerging best practice and regulatory and governmental focus and concerns.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Simulation/Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
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| **FTSE 350 Cyber Security Health Check Report Tracker (UK Government)** | • The Cyber Governance Health Check is a process to assess the extent to which boards and audit committees of FTSE 350 companies understand and oversee risk management measures that address cyber security risk. It is based on a questionnaire comprised of 37 questions (108 FTSE 350 companies responded to the survey in 2014).  
  • **Approach:** High-level, cross-sectoral (non-technical) survey, focusing on governance and risk management of cyber security risk. |
| **NATO Cyber Coalition 2014** | • Three-day training event to test the Alliance’s ability to defend its networks |
| **Operation Cyber storm (US)** | • Exercise to improve the cyber security capabilities of public and private sector, conducted by the Office of Homeland Security  
  • Last report **“Informing Cyber Storm V: Lessons Learned from Cyber Storm IV (June 2015)”**  
  • Approach includes State level exercises, international exercises and simulation of local infrastructure attacks |
| **Operation Waking Shark II (UK, 2013)** | • Annual programme of coordinated simulated cyber-attacks against financial market entities, extended to include US entities (US-UK cyber security Cooperation agreed in 01/2015)  
  • Focus on wholesale banking (incl. investment banking) and key financial infrastructure  
  • Focus on understanding and minimising the impact of a cyber-attack on the sector, not to test individual firms’ cyber response mechanisms  
  **Approach:** Simulation of a concerted cyber-attack against the UK financial sector by a hostile nation state with the aim of disrupting the wholesale market and support infrastructure |
| **White House Summit on Cyber Security and Consumer Protection (07/2015)** | President issued Executive Order to encourage the development of Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) to serve as hubs for sharing critical cyber security information and promoting collaboration across industry sectors. |